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AT the recently held Michigan Judicial Conference1 most of the circuit judges of the State of Michigan gathered together to engage 
in discussions of the major reform of Michigan practice and procedure 
to take effect on January 1, 1963.2 In the seminars conducted by this 
writer the rules provision which evoked the greatest interest, if not 
the greatest confusion, was a clause designed to mitigate some of the 
effects of the traditional rule against splitting a cause of action.3 In 
light of the controversy and attendant litigation which this novel 
provision is likely to stir up, a brief discussion of the problems it 
creates coupled with alternative suggestions for its interpretation might 
prove useful. Such a discussion is the purpose of this short comment.4 
Decisional law has firmly established the rule against splitting 
causes of action in Michigan.5 It is a "rule of justice" designed to 
protect defendants from "double vexation for the same thing."6 In 
essence it requires plaintiff to bring his entire cause of action in a single 
suit, rather than to bring several suits based on different claims arising 
out of the same cause. Should plaintiff violate the rule against splitting, 
the defendants who are subjected to subsequent suits based on the 
original cause of action may have the later suit or suits dismissed on 
timely interposition of the defense of res judicata.7 The Michigan 
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School; Member of the 
:Michigan and Massachusetts Bars. The author is indebted to Circuit Judge Victor J. 
Baum of the Third Judicial Circuit of Wayne County for enlightening comment on the 
problems involved. 
1. Conference at the Dearborn Inn, Dearborn, Michigan, September 18 and 19, 
1962. 
2. Brought about by the Michigan Revised Judicature Act of 1961 and the 
Michigan General Court RuIes of 1963, both to take effect on January 1, 1963. 
In this article the Revised Judicature Act will be referred to as RJA; the General 
Court RuIes as GCR. 
3. GCR 203.1 (1963) provides in part: "Failure by motion or at the pretrial 
conference to object • • • to a failure to join claims required to be joined constitutes 
a waiver of the required joinder rules, and the judgment shall not merge more than the 
claims actually litigated." 
4. For an earlier discussion of the splitting ruIe and the new provision see Blume, 
The Scope of a Cause of Action-Elimination of the Splitting Trap, 38 Mich. S.B.J. 10 
(Dec. 1959). 
5. See, e.g., Szostak v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 279 Mich. 603, 273 N.W. 284 
(1937), and cases there cited. 
6. Dutton v. Shaw, 35 Mich. 431, 433 (1877). 
7. Defendant has been permitted to amend his answer to raise the defense of 
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Supreme Court has held, for example, that plaintiff, having already 
prosecuted an action to recover the purchase price of some staves 
delivered by him to the defendant, could not prosecute a second 
action against the same defendant to recover the purchase price of 
other staves furnished under the same contract;8 that injuries to a 
person and his property caused by a single tort create but one cause 
of action which cannot be prosecuted in two separate actions; 9 that 
a plaintiff suing to recover for breach of an employment contract must 
bring a single action to recover all the damages for the breach, accrued 
and anticipated, and may not divide the contractual employment period 
into chronological portions, bringing successive suits for the damages 
accruing as each portion expires; 10 and that a "single continuous tort" 
causing damages to two buildings jointly owned by plaintiffs constitutes 
but one cause of action, so that plaintiffs, having unsuccessfully 
prosecuted a suit to recover damages to the first building, were barred 
from bringing a subsequent action to recover the damages to the 
second building.ll 
The theory underlying the Michigan cases seems to be that the 
scope of a single cause of action is determined by reference to the 
transaction or occurrence which gave rise to the various daims, rather 
than to the particular right of the plaintiff which has been infringed.12 
This approach would seem to further the policy of the rule against 
splitting, since the defendant will not, in theory, be subjected to 
multiple suits and the attendant vexation by virtue of a single 
incidentP Nonetheless, it is not always easy to determine whether 
res judicata by leave of court even after the time for amending as of right has passed, 
where the judgment which would bar the second suit is not rendered until the second 
action is well under way. See Szostak v. Chevrolet Motor Co., supra note 5. Cf. the 
interesting case of Continental Ins. Co. v. H. M. Loud & Sons Lumber Co., 93 Mich. 139 
(1892) where plaintiff, an insurance company subrogated to a portion of the insured's 
claim against defendant, was barred from bringing suit on that portion even though 
it did not appear that any other suit on the remaining portion had been brought or 
had ever gone to judgment. Compare National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Foth, 254 Mich. 152, 
235 N.W. 821 (1931). 
8. Dutton v. Shaw, supra note 6. Also see Brewster Loud LumbEr Co. v. General 
Builders' Supply Co., 228 Mich. 559, 200 N.W. 283 (1924) and Corey v. Jaroch, 229 
Mich. 313, 200 N.W. 957 (1924). 
9. Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., 264 Mich. 60, 63, 249 N.W.467 (1933) (dictum). 
10. Arnold v. Masonic Country Club, 268 Mich. 430, 256 N.W. 472 (1934). The 
same rule applies as to continuing torts. See Thompson v. Ellsworth, 39 Mich. 719 (1878). 
11. Szostak v. Chevrolet Motor Co., supra note 5. 
12. See Committee Comment to GCR 203.1 (1963) in Callaghan's Mich. PI. & 
Pr., Rules, 67 (2d ed. 1962). 
13. It should be noted that the Michigan Supreme Court has refused to permit 
multiple plaintiffs, holding several claims arising out of a single course of conduct by the 
defendant, to join all their claims in a single suit. See Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. R. H. Hidey, Inc., 349 Mich. 490, 84 N.W.2d 795 (1957). Such refusal does 
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various claims constitute a single cause of action or several causes, 
even under the Michigan view. The difficulty is created by the un-
certainty as to whether defendant's activities constitute a single trans-
action or occurrence or several transactions or occurrences, as where 
defendant in an altercation with plaintiff is alleged to have assaulted the 
plaintiff and slandered him as well.14 
Furthermore, the phrase "cause of action" rests on shifting sands, 
its definition frequently changing in accordance with the particular 
procedural problem before the court.l5 Thus, for example, when plain-
tiff in Talbot v. Stoller16 sought to amend her declaration after the 
statute of limitations had run, the court held that the proposed amend-
ment, which added new claims based essentially on the conduct of 
the defendant which was the basis of the original declaration,17 con-
stituted a new cause of action.ls The policy behind the statute of 
limitations-to prevent the presentation of stale claims of which the 
defendant was not aware prior to the expiration of the limitations 
period-might well justify such a result. But it does not follow that 
the court intended by its holding in Talbot v. Stoller to permit a plain-
tiff to bring multiple suits against a single defendant based on dif-
ferent theories of recovery or different damages but arising out of what 
is literally a single occurrence.l9 Such a practice would seem to under-
mine the anti-vexation policy of the splitting rule.20 
As a consequence of the difficulty of defining a cause of action 
for the purpose of the rule against splitting, it is possible that attorneys 
not conflict with the policy underlying the splitting rule, however, since it is usually the 
defendant himself who objects to the joinder of the separately held claims. 
14. See Clark, Code Pleading § 19 (2d ed. 1947). Also see Harris v. Avery, 5 Kan. 85 
(1869). 
15. See Blume, supra note 4. 
16. 366 :Mich. 296, 115 N.W.2d 81 (1962). 
17. The original declaration sought recovery for disfigurement, shame, and humilia-
tion resulting from the defendant doctor's allegedly negligent injection of the plaintiff 
"'ith the drug "Imferon." The proposed amendment added "a new theory that there was 
no necessity for the injection in the first place, which the appellees should have known. As 
a result of this alleged negligence, there is a claim that the appellant is subjected to 
the danger of sarcoma induction and that the injury is the mental anguish which the 
appellant will suffer as a result of an awareness of this possibility." Talbot v. Stoller, 
supra note 16, at 301, 115 N.W.2d at 83. 
18. It therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend her 
declaration. 
19. Similarly, the standards applied by the courts in determining whether or 
not a pleading states a cause of action should not apply to the determination of 
whether plaintiff has split his cause of action. For the purpose of a demurrer for 
failure to state a cause of action (or its modern counterpart) the courts are normally 
unconcerned with the question whether plaintiff has joined all his claims arising from 
the same occurrence or transaction. See Blume, supra note 4. But see Continental Ins. 
Co. v. H. M. Loud & Sons Lumber Co., supra note 7. 
20. See text at note 6, supra. 
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will occasionally divide a single cause into separate actions. Unless 
the several actions are prosecuted concurrently and the defendant in 
one of them moves to dismiss on the ground that another action is 
pending for the same cause, the plaintiff may not learn that he has 
split his cause until defendant pleads the first judgment as a bar to a 
later suit. By then, of course, the damage is irreparable. Plaintiff can 
no longer amend the first suit to add the omitted claims.21 It does not 
follow, however, that the plaintiff has been injured. If judgment in 
the first action was for the defendant on the merits, and if the issues 
actually decided and litigated in the first action were the same as 
those raised in the dismissed suit, amending the first action to add the 
omitted claim would probably have served no useful purpose. Further-
more, even if plaintiff were allowed to proceed with the second suit, 
defendant could raise the doctrine of collateral estoppel, thus pre-
cluding the plaintiff from contesting the issues actually decided earlier. 
For example, in a case where plaintiff has instituted two suits based 
on defendant's single act of negligence-one for injuries to his person 
and the other for damage to his automobile-and, after trial on the 
merits, judgment for defendant is entered in one of Gem, the rule 
against splitting works no real hardship on the plaintiff.22 He has 
had his day in court as to the central issues of liability. If the issues in 
the several actions are different, however, as where a single occurrence 
gives rise to separate claims based on different substantive rights,23 a 
judgment for defendant in the first action might not actually dispose 
of the issues raised in the second. In this situation it is only the rule 
against splitting (or the statute of limitations) which Gould prevent 
the plaintiff from pursuing the claims he omitted from the first action. 
Likewise, where plaintiff wins the first action on the merits, the rule 
against splitting may prevent him from prosecuting the rest of his 
claim, which may be equally meritorious. 
In these two latter situations the doctrine against splitting may 
work an unfair hardship, particularly where the failure to join all 
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence was in-
21. But see RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 62, comment m (1942), which states: 
Where the plaintiff brings separate actions based upon different items included 
in his claim, and in none of the actions does the defendant make the objection 
that another action is pending based upon the same claim, a judgment for the 
plaintiff in one of the actions does not preclude him from obtaining judgment 
in the other actions. In such a case the failure of the defendant to object to the 
splitting of the plaintiff's claim is effective as a consent to the splitting of the 
claim. 
22. This assumes that the plaintiff lost the first action either 'Jecause he failed 
to meet the burden of proving the defendant negligent or because the defendant proved 
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 
23. E.g., a single dispute out of which assault, battery, and slander claims arise. 
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advertent or innocent. Indeed, it was this hardship the framers of the 
new rules apparently sought to avoid by drafting rules 203.1 and 301.2 
of the new General Court Rules.24 Rule 203.1 first requires the plaintiff 
in his complaint to state every claim against an opposing party which 
"arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter 
of the action."25 It then eases the harsh requirements of compulsory 
joinder by adding: "Failure by motion or at the pretrial conference 
to object . . . to a failure to join claims required to be joined con-
stitutes a waiver of the required joinder rules, and the judgment shall 
not merge more than the claims actually litigated." To further insure 
that compulsory claims are not inadvertently overlooked, the judge 
at the pretrial conference is directed by rule 301.2, in every case, to 
"inquire of the parties as to whether or not all claims arising out of 
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the action 
have been joined as required by subrule 203.1 and he shall include the 
answers and any order entered pertaining to this subject in his pre-trial 
summary of results." 
While on their face these provisions seem simple enough, they 
are open to a variety of interpretations. 
First, the words may be given their broadest construction: Any 
claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the basis of 
the original action which is omitted for any reason, knowingly or not, 
may be the basis of a new action unless the defendant files his objection 
to the failure to join. It would not matter whether the omitted claim 
is one which would traditionally be considered the basis of a separate 
suit-as in the slander-assault hypothetical-or whether the claim is 
one which is traditionally pursued as an element of a larger claim-
as a claim for damage for a specific type of injury in a negligence 
action. Furthermore, the defendant's ability or inability to discover 
the existence of the omitted claim in time to make his objection to the 
failure to join would not be a matter to be considered in determining 
whether a subsequent suit on the omitted claim could be brought. 
Likewise, the plaintiff's innocence, lack of diligence, or intention in 
omitting a compulsory claim would be irrelevant. Lastly, a new action 
could be brought irrespective of whether the plaintiff won or lost the 
first action.26 
As a corollary to this "broad" approach, the objection required of 
the defendant would have to particularize the claim omitted; a general 
24. See Committee Comment to GCR 203.1 (1963) in Callaghan's Mich. PI. & Pr., 
op. cit. supra note 12. 
25. Unless it requires "for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom 
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." GCR 203.1 (1963). 
26. See text infra, at p. 509. 
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objection to non-joinder would not operate to bar a subsequent suit 
on the omitted claim.27 Similarly, the judge or the opposing party at 
the pretrial hearing would not be permitted to force the plaintiff to 
waive his right to bring another action by requiring him to agree, in 
general terms, that all compulsory claims have been joined. 
The impact of this interpretation of the rules under consideration 
is really to replace the anti-vexation policy of the rule against splitting 
with a policy favoring the presentation of all meritorious daims. While 
the adoption of this new policy would constitute a major change from 
the court's former attitude toward multiple actions teo recover for 
claims arising out of the same transaction, it would not necessarily 
increase vexatious litigation, for several reasons. In the first place, the 
statute of limitations would still operate as a boundary limiting the 
time within which additional actions arising out of the same transaction 
could be brought. Secondly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would 
prevent the re-presentation in open court of evidence relating to issues 
which have already been litigated and decided in an earlier action.28 
Thus in many cases the new action based on a claim arising out of 
the original transaction could be settled by a partial summary judg-
ment,29 plus a trial on the question of damages only. Or, if plaintiff 
lost the first action, and the liability issues were the same, the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel would effect the entire disposition of the second 
action. Thirdly, it is open to question whether multiple actions arising 
out of a single transaction are really vexatious. This is illustrated by 
the fact that in cases involving multiple plaintiffs suing to recover 
for claims arising out of a single tortious act of the defendant-as 
opposed to cases in which one plaintiff brings multiple claims-it is 
ordinarily the defendant who objects violently to misjoinder and de-
mands that plaintiffs proceed separately against him.ac' If multiple 
suits are vexatious per se, one would expect defendant to be delighted 
to have all of the plaintiffs dispose of their claims against him in one 
action. But such has not been the case. 
Furthermore, the benefits to be derived from this interpretation 
27. Should the objection be raised by written motion, the new rules require that the 
grounds upon which the motion is based be stated with particularity. GCR 110.2(1) 
(1963). 
28. The Committee Comment to GCR 203 (1963) expressly states: ''Nothing in 
this rule changes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppeI." Callaghan's Mich. 
Pl. & Pro op. cit. supra note 12. See generally Jacobson V. Miller, 41 Mich. 90, 1 N.W. 
1013 (1879); and Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 Iowa L. 
Rev. 217 (1954). Also see Restatement, Judgments § 68, comment a (1942). 
29. GCR 117 (1963). 
30. See, e.g., Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. R. H. Hidey, Inc., 349 Mich. 490, 
84 N.W.2d 795 (1957). 
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may far outweigh the slight burdens to defendants who will be forced 
to defend additional suits. Conceive of the negligence case in which 
plaintiff's principal injuries are broken limbs, contusions and abra-
sions. Plaintiff is subjected to careful physical examinations by both 
his own physicians and defendant's physicians. Prior to and during the 
trial no further symptoms appear which any competent physician or 
specialist could detect. At the trial a modest verdict is rendered in 
plaintiff's favor. Imagine further that after the entry of final judg-
ment, but before the statute of limitations has expired, one of the 
contusions develops into a cancerous lesion with a consequent prog-
nosis of total disability and early death. Under current practice it is 
small solace to plaintiff and his family to offer as an excuse for refusing 
to permit further recovery the traditional retort: "You have had your 
day in court." If in reply it is suggested that plaintiff could have 
postponed suit until near the end of the limitations period, the simple 
answer is that an impoverished plaintiff, at least, should not have to 
defer recovery so long. Similar cases might be posited where the failure 
to press all the claims arising out of the same transaction is caused by 
the oversight, neglect, or even stupidity of the plaintiff's attorney. The 
suggested "broad" interpretation would cover even these situations. 
In terms of the law's image to the society, it might be far wiser to sub-
ject a defendant to an additional claim arising from the transaction 
which is the basis of the original suit-especially where liability in the 
first case was clear and the issues in the second suit are the same except 
for damages-than to throw up our hands and force the aggrieved 
plaintiff to proceed against his negligent attorney. The attendant 
hardship, both to the plaintiff and the lawyer coupled with the jaun-
diced view of lawyers and the law which the aggrieved plaintiff can 
be expected to develop as the dispute proceeds, should be of weighty 
concern to the courts j indeed, of much greater concern than the hard-
ship to the defendant who might have to defend a separate action in 
which most of the issues will probably be settled by collateral 
estoppel.S! 
It may be argued that the first interpretation gives rise to its own 
problems. The plaintiff's attorney may deliberately decide to sever the 
multiple claims in order to force defendant to settle high or to heap up 
a greater total verdict by separate trials than he could hope to recover 
in a single trial. The quick answer to this, however, is that if plaintiff 
31. Of course, if the statute of limitations has run on the omitted claim the 
aggrieved plaintiff will usually have no other recourse than to proceed against his at-
torney. For the purpose of this discussion, however, we are assuming that the claim upon 
which the second suit is based is not barred by the statute of limitations. 
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is aware that he is splitting his claims this information will probably 
be available to defendant's attorney as well by way of discovery. The 
objection to non-joinder can then be raised with particularity as re-
quired by the rules, and the plaintiff can be forced to join his claims. 
Furthermore, in the run of the mill case, no useful purpose could 
possibly be served by dividing claims for damages-such as hospital 
expenses and pain and suffering-into separate suits. 
It can also be argued that the broad interpretation of the rule 
fails to take into account the efficient administration of justice. That 
is, by permitting several actions based on a single transaction the 
parties are unnecessarily wasting judicial resources and crowding 
the dockets. To this contention it may be replied that the committee 
framing the rules expressly stated in their comments that "if the 
parties ... desire to litigate their claims in two pieces, the harshness 
of the merger doctrine should not prejudice them."32 In addition, in 
the cases in which the key issues in the subsequent actions are the 
same as those litigated in the first action, the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel should permit an efficient and speedy determination of the 
second action, if not a settlement. Thus, judicial administration would 
not be unduly burdened. 
It might also be contended that where defendant has demanded a 
jury trial separate trials of different claims arising out of the same 
transaction might violate his constitutional right to trial by jury. Of 
course, the United States Constitution does not require the states to 
provide jury trials in civil cases involving rights created by state 
law.33 The Michigan Constitution, however, provides that "the right 
to trial by jury shall remain."34 In the area under 'discussion the 
problem would only arise in those cases where the defendant has de-
manded jury trial but has failed to object to non-joinder. Where the 
defendant is aware that a compulsory claim has been omitted from 
plaintiff's case and does not raise his objection for tactical reasons it 
would seem to follow that he has waived his right, if such exists, to 
have all the compulsory claims tried by the same jury.35 Where the 
failure to object to non-joinder of related claims results from the 
defendant's ignorance of such claims, however, the issue is clearly 
framed, viz., in such case does the Michigan Constitution require that 
32. Callaghan's Mich. PI. & Pr., op. cit. supra note 12, at 68. 
33. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. BomboIis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Olesen v. 
Trust Co. of Chicago, 245 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 896 (1957). 
34. Const. 1908, art. II, § 13. 
35. This would seem to be a reasonable construction to be give:J the constitutional 
provision, which provides, when read together with GCR 203.1 (1963), that in civil cases 
the right is waived unless properly demanded. 
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all the claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence be 
tried by the same jury in a single trial? The problem raised by this 
issue is quite similar to that raised by rule 505.2, which permits 
separate trials on separate claims and even on separate issues. This 
latter provision, which has been copied verbatim from rule 42 (b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has evoked a great deal of 
discussion. The consensus seems to be that it does not violate con-
stitutional principles.36 None of the discussion, however, has been 
addressed specifically to the Michigan Constitution, which grants the 
right to trial "in such instances, and with such safeguards, as the 
common law accorded.n37 At common law, moreover, related claims 
falling under the same form of action would ordinarily be tried in a 
single suit with a single jury. But claims falling under different forms 
of action might have to be tried separately even though they arose 
out of the same transaction.3s It can be argued, therefore, that there 
should be no constitutional barrier under the new rules for trying 
claims separately if, prior to the effective date of the new rules, they 
could not have been tried together. On the other hand if, at common 
law, the particular claims had to be tried together by a single jury-
as in the case of different injuries to the same person arising from a 
single act of negligence-then they must be tried together by the 
same jury under the new rules, as well. The difficulty with this analysis 
is that it attaches too much significance to the common law procedure, 
constantly requires references back to that procedure, and does not 
take into account the fundamental nature and purpose of the jury 
trial. The unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. CO.,39 wherein the Court ap-
proved the use of a partial new trial even though the remanded issues 
would have to be tried by a different jury, would seem to represent a 
far more sensible approach to the problem. After admitting that partial 
new trials had not been permitted at common law, Mr. Justice Stone 
continued: 
But we are not now concerned with the form of the ancient rule. It is 
the Constitution which we are to interpret; and the Constitution is 
concerned, not with form, but with substance. All of vital significance 
in trial by jury is that issues of fact be submitted for determination 
36. See O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. ill. 1960). 
Also see Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.A.]. 1265 (1959); 5 Moore, 
Federal Practice IT 42.03 (Supp. 1961). 
37. See 6 Callaghan's Mich. Pl. & Pro § 38.06 (1947). 
38. See Multiplex Concrete Mach. Co. v. Saxer, 310 Mich. 243, 17 N.W.2d 169 
(1945); Brewster Loud Lumber CO. V. General Builders' Supply Co., 233 Mich. 633, 208 
N.W. 28 (1926). 
39. 283 U.S. 494 (1931). 
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with such instructions and guidance by the court as will afford op-
portunity for that consideration by the jury which was secured by the 
rules governing trials at common law. . . . Beyond this. the Seventh 
Amendment does not exact the retention of old forms of procedure.40 
Therefore, so long as the claims which are to be tried separately 
are sufficiently distinct and independent so that separate juries can 
decide them "without confusion and uncertainty,"41 there should be no 
constitutional objection to separate trials. 
At the Michigan Judicial Conference several other interpreta-
tions of the rules under consideration were advanced which, at the 
time and in the heat of discussion, seemed to make good sense. One 
of them would permit the defendant's attorney by motion or at the 
pretrial hearing to object to failure to join compulsory claims in a 
general way, without specifying the missing claim or claims. Alterna-
tively, the judge at the pretrial conference, exercising his power under 
rule 301.2, could require the plaintiff's attorney to admit that all 
compulsory claims had been joined, and then record the admission in 
the pretrial summary. In either case the intended effect would be to 
prevent the plaintiff from bringing additional actions for claims arising 
out of the original transaction. In the first situation rule 203.1 would 
bring the doctrine of res judicata or its corollary, the rule against 
splitting, into operation. In the second situation the admission in the 
pretrial summary would work an estoppel which could be pleaded by 
the defendant in bar to a subsequent action. Of course it could be 
argued that the pretrial summary only controls the course of the 
particular action in which it is filed and cannot control other actions, 
or that the plaintiff, in spite of his admission, should not be estopped 
to bring another action unless the defendant can show that he has 
been injured by relying on the admission. But assuming, arguendo, 
that the courts permit the defendant to avoid the consequence of the 
rule by either method, the result is the same: the new rule is side-
stepped by a simple practice which would surely become routine in 
every case. That is, the defendant's attorney would file his general 
objection to non-joinder or the trial judge would request the plaintiff 
to admit that all claims had been joined before permitting the case 
to go to trial, or both. Although it may be suggested that the rigors 
of the splitting doctrine might be mitigated by merely directing the 
attention of plaintiff's attorney in each case to the necessity of joining 
all compulsory claims,42 the rules seem to require more. Otherwise rule 
40. Id. at 498. 
41. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., supra note 39, at 500. 
42. Cf. Blume, supra note 4, at p. 13. 
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301.2 would have been sufficient to accomplish this objective and 
rule 203.1 would have been unnecessary. In addition, the theory that 
the rule is only designed to make the plaintiff's attorney aware of the 
dangers of failing to join all of his claims does not take into account 
the cases where an attorney who is aware of such dangers is not yet 
aware that other claims, arising out of the same transactions, exist. 
In such a case the purpose of rule 203.1-to protect innocent parties 
from the harshness of the splitting doctrine-would be frustrated. 
Other alternative interpretations were also advanced at the Con-
ference. It was suggested, for example, that the word "claims" might be 
construed to mean something analogous to "rights." That is, the 
joinder rule might permit the separate prosecution of various rights 
arising out of a single transaction if defendant failed to object to non-
joinder, but that the rule should not be construed to permit a plaintiff 
to divide a single right into several actions. On this basis it could be 
argued that if a "right" to recover for slander and a "right" to recover 
for assault arose out of the same transaction or occurrence, the plain-
tiff might bring two separate actions if the defendant failed to object 
to non-joinder. The same would be true if plaintiff suffered injury to 
his person and injury to his property as a result of defendant's single 
act of negligence. But, if defendant's single act resulted only in injury 
to plaintiff's person, then only a single right has been violated, and 
plaintiff should not be permitted to treat his hospital expenses and his 
pain and suffering, for example, as separate claims under the rule. 
Similarly, a broken limb and a cancerous lesion caused by a single act 
of the defendant would be the basis of a single right or claim, and not 
several claims. 
The merit of this interpretation is that it represents a traditional 
approach to res judicata which relates a cause of action, for purposes 
of splitting, to a single right.43 However, in operation it would merely 
substitute a more liberal splitting rule for the current Michigan rule 
in cases where defendant raised no objection to non-joinder. Further-
more, the determination of what constitutes a single "right" in a 
given case may be just as difficult to make in a particular case as deter-
mining whether there is only one "transaction or occurrence" or many. 
Thus, for example, in a case where the promisor in a single contract 
has agreed to perform several distinct acts, uncertainty might arise 
as to whether the promisee has only one claim arising from the single 
contract, or several claims on which separate actions may be brought.44 
43. The Michigan Supreme Court applied this approach to a case arising under 
New York law in Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., supra note 9. See also Clark, Code 
Pleading § 19 (1947). 
44. E.g., Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n, 73 N.D. 108, 11 N.W.2d 
442 (1943), commented on in Blume, supra note 4, at p. 12. 
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If the interpretation of "claim" is restricted in the manner suggested, 
the chances that a plaintiff might inadvertently split a single claim in-
creases correspondingly. And, in the situation where splitting creates the 
greatest injustice-where plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence could not have discovered that the injuries resulting from 
defendant's negligent act were much more serious than he believed 
when he prosecuted the first action-the new rule would afford no 
protection. It is suggested, therefore, that the interpretation which 
equates "claim" with "right" be rejected. 
Some judges also proposed that rule 203.1 should be construed to 
limit its anti-splitting protection to cases where the plaintiff in the 
exercise of due diligence could not have discovered that he had omitted 
a compulsory claim in the original suit. Somewhat similarly, a sugges-
tion was offered that the defendant not be subjected to multiple actions 
arising out of the same transaction for failure to object to non-joinder 
of omitted claims unless by exercising reasonable diligence he could 
have discovered the omitted claims in time to make seasonable 
objection.45 
Neither construction would seem to be wise. As to the first, 
the requirement of due diligence on the plaintiff's part would eliminate 
from the protection of the rules most of the common situations in 
which splitting occurs-where plaintiff's attorney through ignorance, 
inadvertence, or carelessness, overlooks a compulsory claim. Insofar 
as the rule is intended to protect "innocent parties" from losing 
meritorious claims through their attorney's oversight, such intent would 
be frustrated.46 
As to the second construction, there is nothing in the rule which 
suggests that the requirement that defendant object to non-joinder is 
waived where he cannot be expected to know of the omitted claim. 
Furthermore, if plaintiff knows of the omitted claim, defendant, by 
diligent use of the discovery instruments available to him, should be 
able to learn of such claim. It is only where plaintiff himself is not 
aware of the existence of an omitted claim or where defendant does not 
utilize the discovery process for fear of alerting the plaintiff to new 
claims, that defendant might be ignorant of omitted claims even though 
he has exercised due diligence.47 In the first instance the plaintiff 
45. Some judges at the Michigan Judicial Conference proposed that GCR 203.1 be 
amended by adding either one or both of these suggested qualifications. 
46. Committee Comment to GCR 203 (1963), Callaghan's Mich. Pl. & Pr., op. 
cit. supra note 12. 
47. Where the defendant passes up his opportunity to seek discovery as to non-
joined claims for tactical reasons he may be exercising due diligence in the protection of 
his client's interests. It does not necessarily follow, however, that this would satisfy the 
diligence requirement of rule 203.1 if that requirement were read into the rule. 
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should not be barred from later pressing the omitted claim, for reasons 
already discussed. In the second situation, the defendant, by attempting 
to maintain a tactical advantage, should not be permitted to frustrate 
the requirements of the rule. That is, if he elects not to seek discovery 
concerning a possible claim for fear of alerting the plaintiff, he should 
be deemed to subject himself to the risk that the plaintiff will later 
discover such claim and bring suit upon it. 
Finally, the possibility that the protection against splitting rule 
depends upon inadvertent omission of claims is negated by the Com-
mittee Comment to the rule, which provides: "[I] f the parties . . . 
desire to litigate their claims in two pieces, the harshness of the merger 
doctrine should not prejudice them."48 
One last interpretational problem should be mentioned. Rule 
203.1 provides that failure by the defendant to object to non-joinder 
will result in a judgment which "shall not merge more than the claims 
actually litigated" (emphasis supplied). The .use of the word "merge" 
in this setting could mean that the rule should only apply when the 
judgment in the first action is for the plaintiff. If the judgment in that 
action is for the defendant, then the traditional rule of res judicata 
which bars the plaintiff from bringing another suit arising out of the 
same transaction or occurrence should apply. In other words, the word 
"merge" could be interpreted in its technical sense.49 If this interpreta-
tion were adopted a plaintiff would be barred from bringing another 
suit on a claim arising out of the same transaction if he lost the first 
suit. While this construction of the rule makes sense in cases where the 
issues actually litigated and decided in the first suit will be dispositive 
of plaintiff's claim in the second suit, it may work an injustice when 
the claims, although arising out of the same transaction, raise entirely 
different issues and require different proofs, e.g., where plaintiff 
seeks to recover for assault and slander arising out of the same alterca-
tion. It is suggested, therefore, that the word "merge" be interpreted in 
its broadest sense to include both "merger" and "bar." 
CONCLUSION 
It must be recognized that the first suggested interpretation of 
new rules 203.1 and 302.1 creates a new concept of res judicata or 
splitting, whereby the policy against vexation caused by multiple 
actions arising out of a single cause of action is subordinated to a 
48. Committee Comment to GCR 203 (1963), Callaghan's Mich. PI. & Pr., op. cit. 
supra note 12, at 68. 
49. Cf. Luplow v. Aubry Cleaners and Dyers, Inc., 366 Mich. 353, 115 N.W.2d 110 
(1962). 
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policy favoring the protection of plaintiffs from the loss of meritorious 
claims. The anti-vexation policy is not scrapped, however, since the 
statute of limitations and the doctrine of collateral estoppel will still 
operate, respectively, to bar the presentation of stale claims and to 
prevent the relitigation of issues once litigated. 
The alternative interpretations which have been suggested would 
all tend to partially recreate the conditions which gave rise to the 
hardships sought to be eliminated by the framers of the new rules. 
In this respect they would tend to nullify the protective effect of the 
new rules. 
Another important point to consider is that in the vast majority of 
cases the plaintiff will either join all of his "compulsory" claims auto-
matically or the defendant will be in a position, without alerting the 
plaintiff to claims about which he is unaware, to object to the non-
joinder of specific claims. It is only in the unique and exceptional case 
that the new rules will operate to license more than one action arising 
out of a single transaction or occurrence. When such a unique case 
arises, however, the possibility of hardship to the plaintiff becomes very 
great. And it is around these cases-the difficult ones-that the 
public's attitude toward the courts (and attorneys) can crystallize. 
It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to adopt the broadest 
possible interpretation of the rules in question-at least experimentally 
-in order to offer some new protection to plaintiffs even against 
possible incompetence of their own attorneys. Indeed, rule 13 seems to 
set the tone for this interpretation of the rules: 
These rules are to be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action so as to avoid the consequences of 
any error or defect in the proceedings which does not afff.ct the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. (Emphasis supplied.) 
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